

**TOP SECRET**

23 June 1951

Dear General Truscott:

The Director passed on to me your letter of 28 May 1951, giving a general roundup of developments to that date. We found your letter extremely useful and I would be grateful to you if you could send the Director and me a letter at periodic intervals, say once a month, giving us the background of developments and those sidelights which it is somewhat hard to glean from the extensive cable traffic between us.

All of our people who have come back from, or through, Germany have told me how effectively you have got the work under way. I wish you would tell me frankly if you are getting the support you need from here.

Henry Peck, who dropped in to see you a couple of weeks ago, told me that on the Army side some question had been raised about the action we had taken on a JCS directive requesting the Agency to put maximum emphasis on the question of preparing for the retardation of the enemy's advance in Western Europe after "D Day". We did receive such a request from the Joint Chiefs. Upon its receipt, the Director took the position that this was such a major task, involving so large an expenditure of funds and such a vast effort from the point of view of personnel, logistics, etc., that the Agency could not properly take it on unless it received a direct mandate from the NSC and, more important still, the wherewithall, both financial and material, to do the job.

This request from the JCS reached us at about the time the Director had submitted to the NSC an overall paper, which we call here the Magnitude Paper, and which emphasized the greatly increasing scope of operations on the OPC side which we were being asked to carry on and the practical impossibility of effectively performing all these tasks unless assured of the complete support on the military side, as well as adequate personnel and funds. The paper also raised the point that the magnitude of these operations was tending to overshadow, and might even prejudice the effective carrying out of, our intelligence, coordinating and evaluation functions.

All these questions, including the retardation question, have now been bundled up in a single package and laid on the doorstep of the NSC, and recently have been the subject of full discussion by the Senior Staff of the NSC. The NSC Senior Staff seems to see eye to eye with us, for the most part, and a paper is now being prepared for submission to the NSC which will define our functions more clearly

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In the operational field and, I trust provide for more effective logistical support, including in particular manpower. I rather doubt whether the NSC will find any other Agency to carry out the covert cold war operations, including guerrilla operations, and all this probably will remain with us, but I hope that our position will be more clearly defined and that we will know what we can count on from the military side.

As regards the specific question of retardation, as proposed by the JCS, we have, particularly those of us who have had experience in guerrilla and resistance activities during the last war, are inclined to feel that there are some on the military side who take a rather unrealistic view of what can be accomplished through preparation of guerrilla operations and sabotage prior to the outbreak of a hot war. No doubt something can be done, and all possible preparation should be made, but I do not share some of the optimistic Pentagon view as to what would actually be accomplished on "D Day" plus 30 to 60 days, and vast sums of money and personnel can be frittered away in this venture. Until you have had a chance to test out your guerrillas, it is a tremendous gamble as to how they will operate and if we are to do much in this field we must train our key personnel in the free world with the ideas of infiltration largely by air drops at the crucial time while trying to build up friendly reception groups in certain vital areas behind the lines.

I give you the above merely for your confidential guidance in case the question should be further raised from the military side, as possibly our military people in Germany have only received the JCS directive and do not have the additional background of subsequent action.

Jack McElroy dined with me a few days ago, and Bedall, Bill Jackson and Frank Wiener were also there so we had a good chance to review our mutual problems. I gathered that Jack was quite satisfied with the way matters were going on our side of the work.

With kindest regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Allen W. Dulles

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